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Abstract. Off-farm labour participation is an important way in which farm house-
holds adapt their labour resources to farm labour needs, and is often viewed as an 
income integration and an insurance against risk. Nevertheless, it has also been ques-
tioned as a step for exiting agriculture. It is therefore important to assess whether or 
not it is a permanent status and which are its determinants. Most papers on this issue 
are based on cross-sectional analyses and thus disregard the problem of persistence in 
the state. Using a 5-wave panel of Italian family farms we estimate different dynamic 
nonlinear panel data models of the determinants of off-farm labour participation. We 
allow for two sources of persistence: unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence, 
and in addition we control for the initial conditions problem. We find a strong per-
sistence in the state and our findings show that, when taking all these features into 
account, the present work state is almost totally explained by the previous state and 
by idiosyncratic characteristics. The variables concerning the farm and the farmer’s 
characteristics, typically found to be relevant in cross-sectional analyses, are not sig-
nificant in the dynamic setting. The reasons for the inconsistency between our results 
and those of cross-sectional studies are discussed, and an interpretation of how the 
determinants influence the off-farm labour participation is presented. The distinc-
tion between true state dependence and individual heterogeneity has important policy 
implications that are discussed. 
Keywords. Off-farm work, farm household, state dependence, panel data, CAP 
reform.
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1. Introduction
Agriculture in most Western countries is characterized by an overwhelming share of 
family farms, which means that farm operation and farm household are tightly linked1. 
In particular, the labour allocation of household members between farm and off-farm 
labour is an important choice for the household. Indeed, the off-farm labour participa-
tion of farmers is a structural feature of both developed and developing economies, and 
off-farm income is an increasing part of farm household income (Oecd, 2003; Eurostat, 
2002). It is part of the secular trend in declining agricultural employment, as productiv-
ity in agriculture increases and, due to the finite nature of land, no additional productive 
and employment basis can be created in the sector (except for intensification). Combin-
ing on- and off-farm work, at the individual and/or at the household level (pluriactiv-
ity), may indeed be an efficient use of the labour resources of households. Taking into 
account income opportunities stemming from the farm and from alternative employments 
allows the growth and stabilization of household income. Nevertheless, part-time farming 
has also been considered for its influence on the prospects of farms. A discussed related 
issue is whether it favours the survival of family farms or it is a step towards the exit from 
farming, with contrasting results. For instance, Weiss (1999) found a negative impact of 
part-time farming on farm survival, while Breustedt and Glauben (2007) found the oppo-
site. These papers are part of a stream of literature dealing with the changes in agricul-
tural labour. This stream is theoretically based on Todaro’s (1969) and Harris and Todaro’s 
(1970) model of labour migration, extended by Barkley (1990), and uses aggregated data 
(e.g. Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; D’Antoni et al., 2012; Petrick and Zier, 2011, 2012; Olp-
er et al., 2014). Their focus is on the net exits from farming, and they do not deal with the 
contemporary presence of on-and off-farm work. 
Our focus is rather on the process of combining on-and off-farm labour and in our per-
spective it is important to ascertain whether off-farm labour participation is a permanent 
status. One important feature in this respect is the flexibility of off-farm work status, i.e., to 
what extent farmers can and do enter and exit an off-farm work status, and for which rea-
sons. Hence, our theoretical reference is the literature on farm household models. Starting 
from the seminal paper by Huffman (1980), labour choices in farm households have been 
widely analysed, initially considering the off-farm labour participation of farm operators 
(Sumner, 1982) and subsequently considering the joint decision-making of off-farm labour 
participation of husbands and wives (e.g. Huffman and Lange, 1989; Tokle and Huffman, 
1991; Lass and Gempesaw, 1992), in addition to including the use of waged labour (Benja-
min et al., 1996; Blanc et al., 2006) and the on- and off-farm labour participation of opera-
tors, spouses and other household members (Kimhi, 1994, 2004; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; 
Bjørnsen and Biørn, 2010; Corsi and Salvioni, 2012; Biørn and Bjørnsen, 2015). Most of the 
research has concerned the U.S., but several analyses are also devoted to the determinants 
of off-farm labour participation in the EU (Corsi, 1994; Benjamin et al., 1996; Weiss, 1997; 
Woldehanna et al., 2000; Juvančič and Erjavec, 2005; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; Salvioni et 
al., 2008; Bjørnsen and Biørn, 2010; Corsi and Salvioni, 2012; Biørn and Bjørnsen 2015). 
1 The high supervision costs of hired labour, due to the technical features of agricultural production, have been 
noted to explain this situation: by contrast, family labour does not require supervision because family members 
are involved in the income that it provides (Pollack, 1985).
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A common feature of this stream of research, with a few exceptions, is that the analy-
ses are based on cross-sectional samples2. This approach nevertheless prevents analysing 
the dynamic nature of off-farm labour participation choices and disregards the persis-
tence of the phenomenon. Persistence means that individuals that have experienced the 
event under study in the past are more likely to experience it in the future than those 
who have not experienced it in the past. However, the reason for persistence can be true 
state dependence and/or heterogeneity (Heckman, 1981a). True state dependence exists 
when the previous state modifies the attitudes, constraints or parameters so that the prob-
ability of the present state is affected by the previous state. True state dependence has a 
truly behavioural origin. For instance, when taking on an off-farm job implies sunk search 
costs, this creates a difference between the choice of taking on a new off-farm job and 
the choice of continuing keeping an off-farm job. Or, if an off-farm job is taken on, there 
might be costs related to the adaptation of the farm operation to the new situation (e.g., 
higher mechanization or a change in the type of farming or in the farming intensity to 
cope with lower family labour input), costs that are not incurred if the farmer already has 
an off-farm job. Obviously, the same holds for the change in opposite direction, i.e., from 
off-farm occupation to no off-farm occupation. This makes the continuation of the off-
farm state more likely than its change. 
Heterogeneity represents the unobservable time-invariant idiosyncratic character-
istics that affect the choices across time periods. While some time-invariant variables 
influencing the choice can be observed and hence controlled for, some are not meas-
ured or are inherently unobservable, such as, for instance, a farmer’s taste or aversion 
for off-farm work. Such variables create a permanent push towards a specific state, 
so that the previous state apparently affects the future one. Persistence and its reason 
are relevant for policy implications. Weiss (1997) notes that “asymmetric adjustment 
behaviour may cause serious problems for designing an appropriate policy to encour-
age (or impede) a specific form of agricultural production such as part-time farming”, 
in particular because policies cannot be easily reversed. By contrast, as noted by Corsi 
and Findeis (2000), if heterogeneity is the principal source of state persistence, then 
more traditional instruments can be used. Persistence has actually been initially ana-
lysed in two waves panel data (Gould and Saupe, 1989; Weiss, 1997; Corsi and Findeis, 
2000; Ahituv and Kimhi, 2002; Juvančič and Erjavec, 2005) and, more recently, in long 
span studies (Bjørnsen and Biørn, 2010 and 2015) accounting for both state depend-
ence and heterogeneity. However, in the case of state dependence it is important to 
control for both the observed and unobserved determinants of initial participation sta-
tus. It has been shown (Arulampalam et al., 2000) that even if the model controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity, in order to disentangle the effect of state dependence from 
unobserved heterogeneity, the initial conditions need to be modelled instead of being 
assumed as exogenously given, since they may be correlated with the unobservables. 
Not accounting for the initial conditions may lead to biased estimates of the effects of 
true state dependence and individual heterogeneity which, in turn, has important poli-
cy implications.
2 Even the most recent research addressing issues related to off-farm labour participation like, e.g., the interrela-
tionship between off-farm work and agro-tourism (Khanal and Mishra, 2014), or between off‐farm labour mar-
ket decisions and agricultural shocks (Mathenge and Tschirley, 2015) use cross-sectional data.
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This paper analyses the off-farm labour participation with a dynamic panel data mod-
el3 allowing for both heterogeneity and true state dependence, and handling the initial 
conditions problem. Since our estimation is performed on a panel sample of Italian farms 
for the 2003-2007 period and in this period a major reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) occurred, this study also accounts for the relevant changes4.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and 
the econometric strategy. In Section 3, the data on which the analysis is based are present-
ed. The estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 4, both from the econo-
metric and the factual perspective. The paper is concluded by some final considerations.
2. Theoretical model and econometric strategy
2.1 Cross-sectional modelling
The theoretical model typically employed to analyse farmers’ off-farm labour choices 
is the well-known farm-household model (Nakajima, 1986; Singh et al., 1986; Huffmann, 
1991), which can be adapted according to Corsi (2007 and 2008) to take into account the 
CAP reform. The model assumes that the farmer maximizes utility over consumption and 
leisure, under constraints of income and time. The income constraint comprises both farm 
income and off-farm wages. The Kuhn-Tucker maximization conditions yield the follow-
ing first-order conditions:
∂(p+s)Q /∂F ≤ μ/λ (1)
w ≤ μ/λ (2)
where Q is the quantity of good produced by the farm; p is its price; s is the coupled pay-
ment per unit of output; F is time spent working on the farm; w is the off-farm market 
wage; and μ and λ are the marginal utilities of leisure and income, respectively. 
In a pluriactive farm, equations (1) and (2) hold as equalities: that is, the marginal 
value product of farm labour (inclusive of the coupled support) is equal to the market 
wage and to the leisure-income Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS)5. 
3 All panel data model are dynamic in that they take into account the time series dimension of the sample. How-
ever, functions that specifically model the effect of lagged dependent variables are usually referred to as dynamic 
panel data models.
4 The 2003 reform (the so-called Fischler reform) has been the most important step in the process of change in 
the CAP from trade and market distorting measures to more neutral interventions, leading to a more decoupled, 
and hence less market distorting, support (Oecd, 2004). Its most important measure was replacing the semi-
coupled subsidies (i.e., subsidies per hectare of specific crops and per animal head) with the fully decoupled Sin-
gle Farm Payment Scheme (SFP), providing income support to farmers regardless of their current production 
decisions. In Italy the decoupling was immediately implemented in the first possible year, 2005. Furthermore, 
disregarding the possibility of introducing forms of regional distribution for the direct subsidies, Italy decided to 
adopt the so-called historical criterion: farmers were granted their SFP according to an entitlement based on the 
semi-coupled subsidies that they received in the 2000-2002 reference period. 
5 Using this model, the impact of a direct payment has long been established (El-Osta et al., 2004; Ahearn et 
al., 2006; Corsi, 2007 and 2008; Hennessy and Rehman, 2008): a decoupled direct payment is tantamount to an 
increase in non-labour income. Hence, for a farmer participating in off-farm work, a decoupled direct payment 
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The reduced form typically employed in analyses of off-farm labour participation 
starts by defining the reservation wage w*, obtained by setting the off-farm labour supply 
to zero and solving for w. The reservation wage is compared to the market wage w, which 
is a function of personal characteristics and the conditions of the local labour market. 
Therefore, participation (indicated by a dichotomous variable y) occurs if w>w*, which 
means that prob(y=1) = prob(w>w*). From the theoretical model, w* is a function of the 
price of agricultural products, variables affecting on-farm labour productivity, and taste 
shifters. The market wage is a function of personal characteristics that influence human 
capital and labour market characteristics. Typically, the reduced-form equations are pro-
bit or logit equations that estimate the influence of these variables on the probability 
of (w-w*) being greater than zero. Four categories of explanatory variables are typically 
included: individual6, household, farm and local market characteristics.
2.2 Dynamic modelling
In a dynamic setting, expected utility and expected income streams have to be con-
sidered. Moreover, the costs for shifting from one work condition to the other are to be 
taken into account. To a large extent, these costs are sunk costs, such as, for instance, 
job search costs and costs for adapting the farm to the new work status and the implied 
labour needs. 
Call C1 the costs for shifting from non-participation to participation and C2 the cost 
for the reverse change; T the time-horizon for work incomes; r the discount rate; wt the 
wage that the farmer could earn by working off the farm in time t; f1t and f2t the farm 
income that the farmer could earn when working and not working off the farm, respec-
tively, in time t. The probability of participation in year t for a farmer not already partici-
pating is (for simplicity, we consider utility as only stemming from income; non-pecuni-
ary benefits from different jobs can be easily incorporated):
prob yt =1| yt−1 =0( )= prob E
t=1
T



















and the probability of continuing not participating is:
prob yt =0| yt−1 =0( )= prob E
t=1
T



















will decrease off-farm work. However, if production and labour allocation decisions are not separate, then it is 
unclear which type of work – on-farm or off-farm – will be reduced. By contrast, a decrease in coupled support 
has both a wealth and a substitution effect. The decrease in the marginal value product of family farm labour 
induces a reduction of on-farm work. Simultaneously, the decrease in income decreases the MRS, which means 
that the farmer consumes less leisure. Hence, the overall result is an increase in off-farm work. Given that the 
CAP reform is a combination of an income payment and a decrease in the average revenue, the two effects oper-
ate in opposite directions.
6 Observable personal characteristics are taken as proxies for individual idiosyncratic preference shifters; some 
attempt has been undertaken to capture non-pecuniary benefits of farm work through personal statements 
(Howley et al., 2012).
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The probability of not participating in time t for a farmer who participates in time t-1 is:
prob yt =0| yt−1 =1( )= prob E
t=1
T




















prob yt =0| yt−1 =1( )= prob E
t=1
T



















Hence, the probability of continuing to participate for a farmer already participating is:
prob yt =1| yt−1 =1( )= prob E
t=1
T



















From a comparison of (3) to (7), it can be concluded that, for every strictly positive 
C1 or C2, prob(yt=1|yt-1=1) > prob(yt=1|yt-1=0). Hence, costs for shifting from one condi-
tion to another create a state dependence, and not including them among the explana-
tory variables would lead to an omitted variable bias. Since potential shifting costs are 
not observable, the issue can be addressed by including the past off-farm work state as an 
explanatory variable in the participation equation as a proxy for the costs for shifting from 
one condition to another. 
A further reason for observed persistence in the labour state can be heterogeneity, i.e., 
farmers’ or farms’ unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics that make participation more 
or less likely; thus, when observing panel data, heterogeneity translates into an apparent 
dependence of the present state on the previous state (spurious state dependence).
2.3 Econometric model
Unlike most previous studies, we exploit the panel nature of our data to analyse the 
determinants of off-farm labour participation, controlling for both true state dependence, 
created by shifting costs, and heterogeneity, and handling the initial conditions problem. 
The probability that a farm operator will work off the farm is estimated by applying a 
dynamic non-linear (probit) random effects model that accounts for both unobserved het-
erogeneity and true state dependence. 
The non-linear dynamic random effect model we start from is:
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(β0xit + γyit-1 + ui + εit) (8)
where yit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the farm operator i participates in off-farm 
work in year t (t=1,…,T), and 0 otherwise, so that yit-1 is used to test the effect of true 
state dependence; Φ is the normal cumulative density function; x is a vector of observable 
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time-variant and time-invariant explanatory variables; β0 and γ are parameters to be esti-
mated; ui is an individual idiosyncratic term that represents time-constant unobservable 
individual characteristics, i.e., heterogeneity; and εit is a random component, uncorrelated 
across individuals and years. 
The standard random effects model assumes that the unobserved individual-specific 
components ui are uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables. In the real world, 
this assumption may not hold. A further issue that may result in biased estimates of the 
parameter of the lagged variable, and hence of the magnitude of state dependence, is the 
initial conditions problem – whether yi1 is independent of ui. The problem is caused by the 
presence in the equation of both the past value of the dependent variable and of an unob-
served heterogeneity term and the correlation between them. The treatment of initial con-
ditions is crucial because misspecification will result in an inflated parameter of the lagged 
dependent variable that measures the magnitude of the cost of shifting employment. 
Different estimators that cope with these issues for the nonlinear dynamic panel data 
model have been proposed: Heckman (1981), Wooldridge (2005) and Orme (2001). It has 
been shown (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009) on the basis of simulation experiments that 
none of the three estimators dominates the other two in all cases. In most cases, all three 
estimators display a satisfactory performance, except when the number of time periods 
is very small. We estimated all three models to test the robustness of our results, but for 
the sake of brevity, we present here only Wooldridge’s (2001) model. The results of the 
other models are largely consistent with the results that we present and are reported in the 
Appendix.
In Wooldridge’s approach, the individual term is assumed to be a function of the ini-
tial condition and the means of the explanatory variables7:
ui = α0 + α1yi1 + α2μi+νi (9)
where yi1 is the state in the first observed year; μi is a vector of the means of the explana-
tory variables over the entire observed period; and νi is a random individual component, 
uncorrelated across individuals. 
The overall model is therefore:
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(α0 +β0xit + γyit-1 + α1yi1 + α2μi+νi +εit) (10)
The model is estimated as a random effects probit by a maximum likelihood method. 
3. Data
This study relies on data collected by the Italian Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) survey. The survey started to be conducted on a statistically representative basis 
7 To reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we adopt the popular version of Wooldridge’s (2005) solu-
tion to the initial conditions problem, and we use the within means of time-varying explanatory variables calcu-
lated over the 4 years following the initial one. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2014) showed that for periods larger 
than 3 this model does not produce significant bias.
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in 2003. The sample is stratified according to criteria of geographical region, economic size 
(European Size Units -ESU) and type of farm (TF)8. The field of observation is the total of 
commercial farms, that is, farms with an economic size greater than 4 ESU (4,800 euro)9. 
In this study, we employ a 5-wave balanced panel of 3,294 farms for which data were 
collected in all years from 2003 to 2007. We only kept family farms10. The models are esti-
mated over the 2004-2007 period because the year 2003 is used to define the initial condi-
tion. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables 
over the 5 years11.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the farm opera-
tor works off the farm. The share of farms operators who have an off-farm job is 6.6 per-
cent over the entire 2003-2007 period. It increases from 6.3 percent in 2003 to 7.3 percent 
in 2007, with a drop to 6 percent in 2004. These percentages are much lower than the 
participation in off-farm work revealed by the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey data (fifty-two percent of farm operators) in the US (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007) 
and by the Farm Structure Survey (thirty-six percent of EU-27 family farm managers) in 
the EU (European Commission, 2008). The lower participation rate recorded in the Italian 
FADN is partly because the FADN refers to professional, larger farms that typically par-
ticipate less in off-farm employment and partly because pluriactivity is less widespread in 
the southern countries of the EU (European Commission, 2008). 
Following previous research, we use four categories of explanatory variables to specify 
the model for the off-farm participation decision: individual, household, farm and local 
market characteristics. 
Individual attributes include age, age squared and gender of the operator; it was not 
possible to control for the effect of education because this information is not collected by 
the survey. Previous research with cross-sectional data typically has found a positive effect 
of age on participation but with a curvilinear pattern (shown by the age squared variable), 
reaching a peak and then declining.
The household non-labour incomes, i.e., capital income and pensions, are used to 
explore the existence of a wealth effect. Non-labour income (capital and pension income), 
is –admittedly, poorly – measured by dummy variables. Larger values are theoretically 
expected to have a negative effect on off-farm participation. Unfortunately, we can only 
measure the presence of these types of income with dummy variables, and we have no 
information on the number and characteristics of other household members. 
Farm characteristics include farm size (in hectares); farm location (mountain, hills 
and plains as base category); total debts in thousand Euro; degree of mechanization (horse 
8 FADN defines a farm as specialized in a TF if the Standard Gross Margin (SGM) for the particular production 
covers more than 2/3 of the total SGM. SGMs are obtained on the basis of the farm area (number of heads) and 
a crop (livestock) and area specific standardised gross margin.
9 Small farms are more interested in pluriactivity. Though 4 ESU (4,800 Euro) is a small size, the exclusion of 
farms below this threshold leads to underestimate the importance of the phenomenon. The results should there-
fore be interpreted as concerning the observation field of FADN.
10 Farms that were not characterized as sole ownership or private partnership were not considered in this analysis. 
11 Ours is an artificial panel data set obtained from a series of cross-sectional surveys. Hence, the weights provid-
ed by the FADN, which are based on Standard Gross Margin, Standard Output, and costs, are no more valid for 
inference to the general population. Therefore, we decided to apply no weight to the observations in our sample. 
The generalization of our results to the general population should therefore be performed with some caution.
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power per hectare of used land); working capital in thousand Euro; specialization in the 
production of labour intensive, seasonal and all-year-round Types of Farming; the pres-
ence of direct selling; and dummies for organic farming and agro-tourism. Farm size is 
typically expected to decrease off-farm participation because larger farms are usually more 
profitable, which makes off-farm labour comparatively less attractive. Mountain and hill 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (2004-7 unless otherwise stated).
  Mean Std.Dev.
Share of off-farm labour participants 2003-2007 0.07 0.07
Share of off-farm labour participants 2003 0.06 0.01
Share of off-farm labour participants 2004 0.06 0.01
Share of off-farm labour participants 2005 0.07 0.01
Share of off-farm labour participants 2006 0.07 0.01
Share of off-farm labour participants 2007 0.07 0.02
Personal characteristics
Operator’s age 54.19 13.60
Operator’s age squared 3121.84 1513.44
Operator’s gender (1=M, 0=F) 0.83 0.38
Farm characteristics
UAA (ha) 33.70 69.74
Share of land in property (%) 0.67 0.39
Working capital (1000 Euro) 128.04 357.75
Total Debts (1000 Euro) 11.87 106.42
Hp/UAA 19.03 44.27
Types of Farming labour intensive all year round (0/1) 0.36 0.48
Types of Farming labour intensive seasonally (0/1) 0.33 0.47
Mountain (0/1) 0.19 0.39
Hills (0/1) 0.45 0.50
Plains (0/1) 0.37 0.48
Direct sales (0/1) 0.21 0.41
Organic farming (0/1) 0.04 0.19
Agro-tourism (0/1) 0.03 0.16
Household characteristics
Pension income (0/1) 0.23 0.42
Capital income (0/1) 0.01 0.11
CAP reform
Coupled Payments (1000 Euro) 3.48 33.79
Single Farm Payment (1000 Euro) 7.84 33.21
Economic environment
Agricultural to total employment (%) 6.35 4.03
VA per inhabitant (1000 Euro) 21.72 5.23
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farms are typically characterized by low returns. Accordingly, the farm location in moun-
tains and hills should be expected to positively affect the off-farm participation of farm 
household members attempting to increase total household income with alternative off-
farm incomes. Nevertheless, these areas typically also provide less employment opportu-
nities, which would have the opposite effect. The higher the debt is, the higher the inter-
est that farmers have to pay to lenders. This situation might provide an incentive to farm 
households to work off-farm to find new sources of income to pay back the debt. There 
are no clear theoretical expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient of mechaniza-
tion. The use of machines could reduce the labour hours required on farms and therefore 
increase the probability of off-farm labour participation. By contrast, a high investment 
in machinery could be a sign of the deep commitment of the household in farm activi-
ties and, more importantly, could raise farm income, thus discouraging off-farm labour 
participation. High levels of working capital are expected to increase productivity and to 
lower off-farm labour attractiveness. Off-farm work is also expected to be discouraged 
in those cases in which farms are specialized in all-year-round labour intensive and, to 
a lesser extent, in seasonal labour intensive types of faming. The use of organic farming 
is anticipated to reduce the likelihood of off-farm work, given the higher labour require-
ments of these farming systems as compared to conventional farming. Finally, direct sell-
ing, in addition to offering agro-tourism services, is labour intensive and should reduce 
off-farm activities12.
The variables that describe the local labour market and the external economic envi-
ronment are at the provincial level (Provinces are administrative bodies that correspond 
to the NUTS-3 level of Eurostat). All data are drawn from national accounting data pub-
lished by Istat, i.e., the national official statistical agency. The agricultural to total employ-
ment ratio is introduced to account for employment opportunities outside agriculture13. 
Value Added per inhabitant is an overall measure of the degree of economic development 
of the area where the farm is located and is also a proxy for the opportunity cost of agri-
cultural labour. These two variables are expected to positively influence the probability 
of off-farm participation because the higher these ratios, the more job opportunities are 
available.
The variable called Single Farm Payments (SFP) is equal to zero before the CAP 
reform implementation in 2005, and is equal to the relevant payment in the following 
years. Hence, it is an indicator of both the policy structural change and of the intensity of 
the intervention. Given that SFP is allocated based on the historical production mix, it can 
be considered as exogenous (indeed, decoupling aims at making public support exogenous 
to production choices). The amount of the SFP is farm-specific, and its impact is a pure 
12 Some of these variables (in particular, the share of rented land, the mechanization variable, and the semi-
coupled payments, presented below) may be suspected of being endogenous because, in principle, the off-farm 
labour choice can influence them. We tested the use of lagged values of these explanatory variables to overcome 
the possible issue, but the results were almost identical to those presented here. The results are available from the 
authors upon request.
13 It would have been desirable to introduce other important variables concerning local labour markets, the activ-
ity rate and the employment and unemployment rates. Unfortunately, in 2004 Istat changed the methodology of 
the labour force surveys; thus, the series from 2004 onward is not comparable to that of previous years. For this 
reason, we could not add these variables. Regardless, if these variables are introduced in the models for the 2004-
2007 period, they are never significant.
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wealth effect. Prior to the introduction of the SFP, eligible farms received partially coupled 
payments (per hectare or per animal head) represented by the relevant variable. The over-
all effect of these latter payments is ambiguous because they may have both an income 
and a substitution effect. 
It is important to note that all the above expected effects of the explanatory variables 
refer to the static farm household model. Hence, they are what the theory predicts when 
changing state implies no cost and no change in farm setting. 
4. Results
4.1 Econometric results
Table 2 shows the results of the estimates. In addition to the results of Wooldridge’s 
model, we report the estimation of a static pooled probit model that assumes no hetero-
geneity and no state dependence. This estimation is tantamount to having cross-sectional 
estimates, which means that, in a sense, it is a benchmark for “traditional” cross-sectional 
analyses of off-farm labour participation. Both models are estimated for the 2004-2007 
period to allow comparisons. We also report the estimates of the marginal effects of the 
variables on the probability of off-farm labour participation. As usual, they are estimated 
at the mean values of the continuous variables and at the median value for the dichoto-
mous variables.
Column [1] gives the standard pooled probit estimates. Actually, the results are largely 
similar to those typically found in cross-sectional analyses. The probability that the farm 
operator participates in off-farm work is found to be affected significantly by the idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of the farmer (age, sex) and of her household (the presence of pen-
sions and of capital income), whereas no statistically significant influence is found for the 
socio-economic conditions at the provincial level. Regarding the farm characteristics, high-
er mechanization rates, higher percentages of owned land, the farm being located in moun-
tainous areas and making use of direct selling, and a higher single farm payment increase 
the probability of working off-farm. By contrast, the use of organic farming techniques, 
higher percentages of working capital and being specialized in the production of all-year-
round labor-intensive agricultural products significantly decrease the probability of the 
operator working off-farm. All these results are commonly found in cross-sectional studies. 
Column [2] gives the estimates of Wooldridge’s model, which accounts for the effect 
of yt-1, i.e., the past off-farm labour state (state dependence), and controls for the initial 
conditions and heterogeneity14. The past state parameter is highly significant15. The cor-
14 We also estimated two further models. The first model (dynamic pooled probit) accounted for state depend-
ence but did not address heterogeneity or the issue of the initial conditions. The parameter related to the past 
state was strongly significant and large. In addition, this model, compared to the pooled sample model, present-
ed a dramatic increase in the log-likelihood, and a likelihood ratio test strongly rejected the restriction implied 
by the static pooled sample. Important changes also occurred even in the covariates, because the parameters of 
all individual characteristics and of several farm characteristics were no more statistically significant.. A further 
model (dynamic random effects) added the state in the initial year and allowed individual heterogeneity. These 
results are presented in the Appendix.
15 As a robustness check, the past state parameter has been compared to the estimates of the other models. To 
compare the parameters of random effects models, they must be rescaled by multiplying them by 1 ρ−  where 
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Table 2. Estimates of the models of off-farm labour participation.
[1] Pooled [2] Wooldridge
Coeff. Std.Err. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Std.Err. Marg. Eff.
y(t-1) - 1.234*** 0.127 0.048
y(0) - 2.724*** 0.293 0.107
Personal characteristics    
Operator’s age 0.011 0.010 0.029 0.040 0.001
Operator’s age squared -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Operator’s gender (1= male) 0.258*** 0.050 0.045 0.321 0.002
Farm characteristics    
UAA (ha) -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.000
Share of land in property (%) 0.370*** 0.051 0.040 0.140 0.350 0.006
Working capital (1000 Euro) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Total Debts (1000 Euro) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
Hp/UAA 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000
TF labor int. all year round (0,1) -0.380*** 0.048 -0.038 0.129 0.239 0.005
TF labor int. seasonally (0,1) -0.091** 0.043 -0.010 0.258 0.223 0.010
Mountain (0,1) 0.107** 0.050 0.012 0.276** 0.137 0.011
Hills (0,1) 0.027 0.042 0.003 0.140 0.121 0.006
Direct sales (0,1) 0.175*** 0.043 0.021 -0.019 0.133 -0.001
Organic farming (0,1) -0.296*** 0.101 -0.026 -0.135 0.401 -0.005
Agritourism (0,1) -0.094 0.116 -0.009 -0.906 0.623 -0.036
Household characteristics    
Pension income (0,1) -0.271*** 0.049 -0.026 -1.384*** 0.127 -0.054
Capital income (0,1) 0.641*** 0.129 0.111 0.695** 0.336 0.027
CAP reform    
Coupled Payments (1000 Euro) -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.000
Single Farm Payment (1000 Euro) 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000
Economic environment    
Ag. to total employment (%) 0.001 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.071 -0.000
VA per inhabitant (1000 Euro) 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.085** 0.039 0.003
2004-2007 averages1    
Pension income (0,1) - 1.205*** 0.197 0.047
TF labor int. all year round (0,1) - -0.607** 0.273 0.014
Constant -1.660*** 0.290 -2.839*** 0.776
Rho - 0.573*** 0.053
log likelihood -3030.73 -1509.54
Chi-squared (df) 438.25*** (21) 
3480.62*** 
(41)
1 Only significant four-year averages variables are reported.
*, **, *** = significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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relation coefficient, which measures the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, is 0.573 and is 
also highly significant. Hence, the results suggest that both true state dependence and het-
erogeneity are important in determining persistence. Heterogeneity represents individual 
unobservable factors, but its effect is symmetrical, as is the case with the other covariates, 
and the issue of heterogeneity is basically an econometric issue, implying biased estima-
tion if not properly controlled. By contrast, true state dependence creates an asymmetry 
in farmers’ behaviour and is an economic issue that stems from true changes in the farm 
setting. The existence of true state dependence is not simply an econometric issue; rath-
er, it is a behavioural issue. Furthermore, the means of the explanatory variables, i.e., the 
parameters involved in the correction of the potential bias due to the initial conditions, 
are also significant. This finding suggests that coping with the initial conditions issue is 
important to avoid biased estimates16.
To measure the effect of the past off-farm labour state on present participation, in 
addition to the marginal effect (ME) shown in Table 2, we calculated the Average Partial 
Effect (APE). The former is an estimate of the change in probability of the outcome due 
to a unit change of the relevant dummy variable, which is evaluated at the mean values of 
the independent variables (or at their median, in the case of dummy variables) and can be 
interpreted as the effect of the relevant variable for a “representative” farm. The latter is 
an average of the difference between the probability of the outcome when the past state is 
set to one and when it is set to zero for each farm at the actual values of the variables. The 
results of the MEs and APEs are 0.048 and 0.058. That is, the probability that the present 
state is participation is approximately 5 percent higher if the past state was participation. 
This finding provides a measure of the part of persistence that is due to heterogeneity. In 
the dynamic model (not shown here), not accounting for heterogeneity or for the initial 
state, the percentages are much higher (0.175 for APE, 0.686 for ME). The reason is that, 
in the dynamic model, the past state variable also absorbs the effect of the unobservable 
idiosyncratic characteristics17. Hence, the comparison with the model accounting for het-
erogeneity suggests that an appreciable part of persistence is due to heterogeneity. 
Although our results provide strong evidence that there is indeed persistence in off-
farm labour participation and that both heterogeneity and state dependence determine 
it, it is difficult to appreciate how much of the persistence is due to either. However, the 
above-mentioned considerations would suggest that heterogeneity could be of greater 
importance than true state dependence. This notion contrasts with the results of Biørn 
and Bjørnsen (2015), who actually find very low levels of covariance among the state-
specific random effects that account for heterogeneity. This can be due to the fact that 
they do not control for the initial conditions problem, which may induce an overestimate 
of true state dependence (Heckmann, 1981b). From their study, it is nevertheless unclear 
ρ is the constant cross-period error correlation (Arulampalam, 2009). After rescaling, the past state parameters 
for the Heckman, Orme, and Wooldridge models are of remarkably similar magnitude (0.874, 0.763 and 0.806, 
respectively).
16 The past state parameter estimated in the dynamic random effects model, including the past state and the ini-
tial state but not controlling for the initial state bias, is 0.704 compared to 0.773 in Wooldridge’s model (rescaled 
values), thus suggesting that not controlling that bias would cause the effect of the past state to be underesti-
mated.
17 Vice versa, excluding the past state variable would cause the effect of the other variables to be overestimated; 
see Ahituv and Kimhi (2002).
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what the relative weight of true state dependence is, although they also find evidence of 
persistence.
In summary, from the econometric perspective, the main conclusions are that cross-
sectional pooled estimation is rejected vs. models that account for heterogeneity and state 
dependency, and that correcting for the initial state is also crucial. 
4.2 Effects of the variables
From the factual perspective, after introducing state dependence and heterogeneity 
and controlling for the initial state conditions, none of the idiosyncratic farmer observable 
characteristics, usually found to be significant in cross-sectional models, is found to have 
statistically significant effects on the probability that the operator works off the farm (see 
section 4.3 for a discussion of these differences in results). 
The two variables related to household income (pensions and capital income) are 
strongly significant. If the household has any capital income, the probability of off-farm 
labour participation is significantly increased, albeit in a limited measure. At the mean 
values of the variables, the probability is increased by 2.8 percent. This finding is not con-
sistent with our expectations and with the results of previous studies (Mishra and Good-
win, 1997; Mishra and Goodwin, 1998; Mishra and Holthausen, 2002), according to which 
farm household wealth acts as a substitute for off-farm work. This effect is interpreted as a 
lower need for extra work income because wealth helps these farms to smooth consump-
tion when income falls. A possible interpretation of the positive result is that off-farm 
employment may be induced by high off-farm wages that, in turn, provide more finan-
cial assets that yield capital incomes18. If a household member has a retirement or inva-
lidity pension income, then the probability that the farm operator has an off-farm job, as 
expected, significantly decreases. In this case, the marginal effect is -5.4 percent. A possi-
ble interpretation is that, for poor farm households, off-farm income that stems from pen-
sions of other members decreases the income needs, thus raising the off-farm reservation 
wage of the operator. Alternatively, the old age of the operator and of the other members 
of the family make them less interested in off farm work. Finally, the presence of elders 
and individuals with a disability in the household increases the time that is devoted to 
caring activities, thus discouraging off-farm work (Salvioni et al., 2008). 
A farm’s being located in mountain areas has a significant and, as expected, positive 
effect. Farms in those areas are typically less profitable, which might induce more plu-
riactivity. The Value Added per inhabitant is significant and, as expected, positive. This 
result confirms our expectations about larger probabilities of off-farm work in more eco-
nomically developed areas i.e., where more job opportunities are available and the alterna-
tive income provided by off farm jobs is higher. All-year-round labour-intensive types of 
18 Remark nevertheless that if this were the case, a problem of endogeneity would result (we are grateful to a 
referee for drawing our attention to this point). Though, applying to non-linear models, such as the one we esti-
mate, the 2SLS method usually employed in linear models leads to “forbidden regression” (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009). Forbidden regressions produce consistent estimates only under very restrictive assumptions that rarely 
hold in practice (see for instance Wooldridge, (2010), pp. 265-268). The risk of producing inconsistent estimates 
further increases when the endogeneity problem is referred to a binary explanatory variable such as capital 
income in our model.
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farming, the share of land in property and the amount of working capital are not signifi-
cant in Wooldridge’s model19. 
Neither the variable of Coupled Payments (before the CAP reform) nor the variable of 
the Single Farm Payment (after the reform) exhibits significant effects. Again, this finding 
makes a difference in respect to the pooled model, for which the SFP variable is strong-
ly significant. Regardless, the sign is negative for semi-coupled payments and positive for 
SFP. The former sign would be consistent with theoretical predictions and would suggest 
that the substitution effect of coupled payments dominates the wealth effect. By contrast, 
the positive sign of the SFP would contradict the theoretical expectations, at least if pro-
duction choices were separable from consumption and family labour allocation choices (if 
not, there are no a priori predictions). The non-significance of decoupled payments is not 
consistent with the results of many previous parametric US studies (Dewbre and Mishra, 
2002; El-Hosta et al., 2004; Goodwin and Mishra, 2004; Ahearn et al., 2006; Serra et al., 
2005), which have found – indeed, very small20 – effects of decoupled payments on farm 
and off-farm labour and on total work hours, but they support more recent results (Pan-
dit et al., 2013), which find that neither direct nor indirect government payments have any 
impact on the off-farm labour supply of farm operators. Also Olper et al. (2014) find for 
the EU that the evidence of a negative effect of decoupled payments on agricultural out-
migration is weak in a dynamic setting, and in no model by Petrick and Zier (2012) do 
direct payments have any effect on agricultural employment. The CAP reform explicitly 
attempted to substitute decoupled for coupled payments without substantially changing the 
total expenditure. Hence, even from a theoretical perspective, its effect is ambiguous (Corsi, 
2007 and 2008), and its weak effects on off-farm participation, if any, are not surprising.
4.3 Discussion
In this paragraph, we discuss the meaning and the implication of persistence in 
terms of farmers’ behaviour and of policy implications, by comparing cross-sectional and 
dynamic panel analyses. Most likely the most striking result – also robust across all esti-
mated models – is that, after introducing state dependence and heterogeneity and control-
ling for the initial state conditions, in none of these dynamic models do the idiosyncratic 
farmer observable characteristics have statistically significant effects on the probability 
that the operator works off the farm. Additionally, many of the farm characteristics found 
to be significant in cross-sectional models are no more significant in this dynamic setting. 
Although more research is needed to generalize our results, our findings are at odds 
with an entire stream of literature based on cross-sectional samples (including some of 
our previous studies), where personal, farm and labour market characteristics are typical-
ly found to be important determinants. We conclude that past experience has a genuine 
behavioural effect in the sense that otherwise identical individuals who did not experi-
ence participation would behave differently from those who did experience it.  In other 
19 Their coefficients are nevertheless significant in both the Heckman and Orme specifications.
20 For instance, the coefficients estimated by Dewbre and Mishra (2002), although statistically significant, indi-
cate that a thousand-dollar payment decreases the total work by approximately or less than one hour per year. 
Regarding off-farm work, the largest estimate is that by Ahearn et al. (2006), who estimate that a thousand-dollar 
payment decreases the probability of off-farm labour participation by 0.4-0.5 percent. 
174 A. Corsi, C. Salvioni
words, we find structural state dependence. We also find that unobservable idiosyncrat-
ic characteristics do have an influence on off-farm labour choice and most likely have a 
stronger effect, but we find scarce evidence of an effect of observable farm and personal 
characteristics. Importantly, this difference emerges when estimating different models 
from the same data and comparing the dynamic model accounting for heterogeneity and 
state dependence vs. the pooled model equivalent to a cross-sectional setting. Thus, the 
problem is how to explain the relevance of the personal and farm characteristics found 
in cross-sectional studies. This problem calls into question the interpretation given to 
the results of cross-sectional studies, that are typically interpreted in causal terms, imply-
ing, e.g., that an older age or a smaller farm size makes farmers more likely to take on an 
off-farm job. Tentatively, we conjecture that the relationship between personal and farm 
characteristics, such as age and farm size, found in models in which past experience is 
not taken into account could be interpreted in the following manner: i) some unobserv-
able characteristics, of both the farm and the farmer, exert a permanent push in the direc-
tion of a particular state. For example, low soil fertility (hence, unobservable lower returns 
from the farm) or a farmer’s preference for non-agricultural work, may create a tendency 
to look for an off-farm job. ii) Some observable characteristics of the farm and the farm-
er (such as small farm size or education) also create a tendency to take on an off-farm 
job. iii) These two groups of variables influence the choice whether to take an off-farm 
job the first time it is made, which is nevertheless contingent on the availability of suf-
ficiently remunerative job opportunities and on a sufficiently low cost of changing status. 
iv) The influence of the age variable found in cross-sectional studies is therefore actually 
because an older age means that, for those who look for an off-farm job, more years have 
passed, which implies that more opportunities of finding such a job may have occurred. 
v) Once the choice is made, the off-farm work status tends to remain the same because 
some farm setting is changed after this choice, because the unobservable and observable 
characteristics remain at work, and because of the costs implied by changing status again. 
Hence, once a status is chosen, the subsequent situation is dominated by the previous sit-
uation; thus, the influence of the observable variables apparently vanishes. In this sense, 
one might think of an “off-farm job trap” and of a “full-time on-farm job trap”. This inter-
pretation of the discrepancy between the cross-sectional and the dynamic models in terms 
of “status traps” should nevertheless be made with some caution, given that our panel is 
not very long, even if it has been proven that 4 years are enough to produce valid and reli-
able results (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009). Anyway, we feel that our results deserve 
attention on a possible misinterpretation of the results of cross-section models. The effect 
of personal and farm characteristics are at risk of being severely exaggerated if the econo-
metrician fails to recognise the presence of persistence. 
Hence, our results and their interpretation also have policy implications. If pluriactiv-
ity is considered by policy makers to be desirable, e.g., because it helps maintain the agri-
cultural activities in a rural area and thus prevents depopulation, then appropriate policies 
have to be chosen to induce farmers to engage in off-farm activities in the area and to 
choose not to quit farming. Our results suggest that the unobservable specific character-
istics of farms and farmers are prevailing in determining persistence. Hence, the levers 
on which to operate are those that permanently change the individual propensity to work 
off the farm, e.g., focusing on education and development of personal skills. Our results 
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show that also true state dependence determines persistence. Hence, along with policies 
affecting individual characteristics, also policies facilitating farmers’ access to the off-farm 
labour market could be appropriate. Given true state dependence, an initial effort is nec-
essary to induce the off-farm labour participation of farmers, but after this initial treat-
ment, incentives are less necessary to sustain the desired behaviour over time. Finally, our 
results suggest that both decoupled and coupled payments are not significant variables 
in explaining the off-farm labour participation of Italian farmers. This is consistent with 
recent US studies (Pandit et al., 2013), while the related literature on the effects of farm 
subsidies on labour outflow from agriculture gives mixed results. For instance, a negative 
effect of Pillar I subsidies on net labour outflow from agriculture had been found by Olper 
et al. (2014) using panel data at the aggregate level, and similar effects are found for subsi-
dies by Breustedt and Glauben (2007), though other papers do not find significant effects 
(Glauben et al., 2006; Pietrick and Zier, 2011 and 2012). Remark nevertheless that these 
results apply to quitting agriculture, not to combining on- and off-farm labour. The impli-
cation of our results is that policymakers should not increase government spending in the 
form of agricultural subsidies to reduce unemployment.
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we examine the issue of the off-farm labour participation of farm opera-
tors. We estimate different models that allow both heterogeneity and true state depend-
ence, and that cope with the initial conditions problem, using a panel sample of Italian 
farms. 
We find a strong persistence in the state, which is mainly explained by unobserved 
heterogeneity. The past labour state is also an important determinant of the off-farm 
labour participation choices of Italian farmers. These results imply that policies aimed at 
fostering off farm employment should focus on interventions that permanently change the 
individual propensity to work off the farm, e.g., focusing on education and development 
of personal skills.
Variables typically found to be significant determinants of these choices, and also 
appearing as such in pooled sample estimations, are no more significant when true state 
dependence and heterogeneity are controlled for. We also find that the effects of the 
change in CAP, and more generally of coupled and decoupled payments, are weak and 
generally insignificant.
To some extent, our results are at odds with the usual interpretation given to the 
results of cross-sectional studies concerning the effect of farm and operator characteris-
tics. In general, our findings point to the conclusion that persistence effects are at work, 
because the choice of a work state modifies the preferences or the constraints that the 
farm operator faces (e.g., because changing status may imply sunk costs), or because an 
operator’s unobservable preference toward off-farm work can be met contingent on local 
job opportunities, and the cumulative probability of finding such a job increases along 
with time. 
The discrepancy between our results and those of the traditional cross-sectional studies 
calls for more research to clarify these issues. Promising research lines could include model-
ling the changes of labour state rather than the states per se, in the line undertaken by Biørn 
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and Bjørnsen (2015), but coping with the issue of the initial values, or using job search 
models and modelling the permanence in the states. This task is left for further research.
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Appendix
We present here the different models that we estimated for dealing with the problems 
of true state dependence heterogeneity, and the initial conditions issue. In the following yit 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the farm operator i participates in off-farm work in year 
t (t=1,…,T), else 0; x is a vector of observable time-variant and time-invariant explanatory 
variables; β0 and γ are parameters to be estimated; Φ is the normal cumulative density 
function; ui is an individual idiosyncratic term representing time-constant unobservable 
individual characteristics, i.e., heterogeneity; and εit is a random component, uncorrelated 
across individuals and years.
The benchmark is the pooled model, equivalent to a cross-sectional model, since it 
assumes that past states have no effect and that all time-invariant variables are included:
180 A. Corsi, C. Salvioni
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(β0xit + εit) with Corr(εit, εis) = 0 ∀ s≠t (Pooled model)
A second model accounts for state dependence, but does not deal with heterogeneity 
nor with the issue of the initial conditions.
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(β0xit + γyit-1 + εit) (Dynamic pooled model)
The third one adds to the past state the state in the initial year (y1) among the explan-
atory variables and allows for individual heterogeneity (ui), modelled as a random effect.
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(β0xit + γyit-1 + ιy1 + ui + εit) (Dynamic random effects model)
The Heckman approach to the initial conditions problem involves assuming the fol-
lowing specification of the initial value of the dependent variable:
yi1 = zi1π + ηi
where zi1 is a vector of exogenous variables including xi1 and other instrumental variables 
(for example pre-sample variables) and ηi is assumed to be correlated with ui, but uncor-
related with εit for t ≥ 2. Then ηi can be written as ηi = θui + εi1 (θ > 0), with ui and εi1 inde-
pendent of one another. It is also assumed that εit and ui are normally distributed with vari-
ance 1 and σu, respectively. The function for the initial time period is therefore specified as
yi1 = zi1π + θui + εi1
and this equation is estimated jointly with the one of the remaining time periods. The out-
put is therefore an estimate of the initial year equation, and of the following years equa-
tion, including the correlation term.
Since the initial conditions problem is due to the correlation between the yit-1 regres-
sor and the individual heterogeneity term, Orme’s approach is to insert a correction term 
in the equation. He substitutes ui with another unobservable term uncorrelated with the 
initial observation, under the assumption that ui and εit follow a bivariate normal distribu-
tion. This term: 
hi = E(ui|yi1) = (2yi2-1)συϕ(ζ’zi /σu)/Φ[(2yi2-1) ζ‘zi /σu] 
is the generalized error term from a probit estimated for the initial year, where z are the 
covariates, ζ the relevant parameters, ϕ and Φ the normal density and distribution func-
tions. The generalized error terms are inserted as regressors in a random effect probit 
model for the remaining years, so that the overall model is:
Prob(yit=1) = Φ(α0 +β0xit + γyit-1 + τhi +νi +εit) (Orme’s model)
The following table presents the results of all the above models, also including for 
comparison Wooldridge’s model.
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